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Abstract
The present study attempted to either extend, modify 
or challenge Rokeach's (1973) Self-confrontation theory of 
value change. Rokeach (197 3) found that subjects who were 
confronted with specific self-confrontation messages, 
which were designed to make differences between their value 
systems and self-concepts salient, were more likely than con­
trol subjects to change the rank-ordering of the values 
Freedom and Equality in a ranking task containing 18 values. 
Rokeach explained this phenomenon by invoking the concept 
of self-dissatisfaction, which he said subjects came to feel 
as a result of being exposed to the self-confrontation messages.
The present study compared this explanation with the 
Reference Group Influence theory of Kelman (1958) and others 
who felt that subjects would modify values merely by iden­
tifying with certain positively perceived reference groups.
In a simple single-factor design, four experimental 
conditions were compared with a control condition. The 
experimental conditions consisted of separate self-confront­
ation manipulations derived from Rokeach's original manip­
ulation. These were:
(1) an Intrinsic Inconsistency condition which implied to 
subjects an inconsistency between their own value systems 
and self-concept, based on information not taken from an 
external source; (2) a Reference Group only condition, which
v
exposed subjects to value rankings of a potential reference 
group; (3) an Extrinsic Inconsistency condition, which im­
plied an inconsistency between values and self-concept, 
based on the value rankings of the reference group; (4) 
a Replication condition, which was a virtual replication of 
Rokeach (1973); and (5) a Control condition. Behavioral 
measures which were thought to reflect value change 
were also taken.
Results indicated that the Intrinsic Inconsistency 
subjects were the only ones to elevate rankings of the 
value "Equality" significantly more than the controls. 
Although the Intrinsic Inconsistency condition's responses 
to behavioral measures were also greatest among the five 
conditions, this relationship was not significant. Thus 
only limited support was found for Rokeach's self-confron­
tation theory, and no evidence svas found for a reference 
group influence effect. Possible explanations for 
these findings were offered as well as possibilities 
for future research.
vi
Group Influence and Cognitive Consistency 
as Determinants of Value Change:
A Methodological Analysis of 
Self-Confrontation Theory 
The study of attitudes and attitude change has 
been one of the major areas of investigation for many 
social psychologists for almost four decades. These 
researchers have busied themselves with attempts at 
theoretical formulations designed to establish relation­
ships between attitudes and all aspects of behavior. 
Ultimately, the study of attitude change brought about 
various postulations concerning the mechanisms involved 
in maintaining and/or achieving cognitive consistency. 
Specifically, theories tried to explain people's attempt 
to reconcile perceived differences between two or more 
held attitudes. The theories generally held that these 
perceived differences or inconsistencies resulted in 
some specific affective or motivational state, such 
as cognitive dissonance. The person was then motivated 
to act in a way which would remove this "uncomfortable" 
state by reducing the inconsistency. This could be done 
by adopting some attitude or behavior which was consis­
tent or congruent with other attitudes or behaviors.
Rokeach (1973) has classified various cognitive 
consistency theories in terms of the nature of various 
types of inconsistency. For example, Abelson and Ro­
senberg (1958) proposed a theory of cognitive-affective 
consistency which dealt with contradictions between 
the perceived usefulness of an attitude object to real­
ize certain goals, and the favorable or unfavorable 
attitudes toward the object. Similarly, Osgood and 
Tannenbaum's (1955) Gongruity theory posed the effects 
of contradictions between two attitude systems. Heider's 
(1958) and Newcomb's (1959) theories described contra­
dictions between an attitude system and a cognition 
about a significant other's attitude, and McGuire (1960) 
dealt with contraaictions between'beliefs concerning 
one attitude object. Dissonance theorists (Festinger, 
1957) discussed conflict between an attitude and a be­
havioral cognition. Finally, Hovland (1957) dealt with 
contradictions between one’s own attitude and the per­
ceived attitude of significant others.
Another issue precipitated by research in attitude 
change has been the validity of attitude change findings 
over the long term. It has even been suggested that 
researchers have tended to emphasise the search for var­
iables affecting the change process itself, while not 
concerning themselves with factors underlying the per­
sistence or non-persistence of these changes. Cook
3and Play (1978) point out that
Most researchers have focused on the deter­
minants of immediate attitude change...
However, there has teen no corresponding in­
terest in studying the conditions under which 
attitude change persists over time. Indeed, 
there is no comprehensive review of the per­
sistence literature other than short lists of 
relevant experiments up to 1969. (p. 2)
Similarly, Rokeach (1973) has stated that the chan­
ges in attitudes found in cognitive consistency studies 
are typically found to he short-lived. Even though 
achieving consistency implies restoration of a previous­
ly disrupted state of equilibrium,
cognitive theories in social psychology have 
not asked whether an attitude change merely 
restores the consistency held at an earlier 
level or represents a higher or lower, more or 
less integrated, or mature or self-actualized 
level of consistency. (p. 223)
.So Rokeach is implying that attempting to change atti­
tudes by making attitudinal discrepancies salient to 
subjects is useless since it only results in short-term 
change.
Rokeach, in his theory, has tried to circumvent
the problem of short-term attitude change by invoking 
the concept of value. Rokeach (1973) sees values as rnor 
central than attitudes. A value is seen as an
enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief 
that a specific mode of behavior or end-state 
of existence is preferred to an oppositive 
mode of behavior or end-state. This belief 
transcends attitudes toward objects and sit­
uations, ideology, presentations of self to 
others, evaluations, judgments, justifica­
tions, comparisons of self with others, and 
attempts to influence others. (p. 25)
Rokeach makes clear the major differences between 
an attitude and a value:
an attitude refers to an organisation of 
several beliefs around a specific object 
or situation. A value, on the other hand, 
refers to a single belief of a very specific 
kind. It concerns a desirable mode of behav­
ior or end-state that has a transcendental 
quality to it, guiding actions, attitudes, 
judgments and comparisons across specific ob­
jects and situations and beyond immediate goals 
to more ultimate goals. (p. 18)
In this sense, the differentiation between value
5and attitude is clearly made by virtue of the emphasis 
being placed on the arbitrary evaluative nature of val­
ues. Whereas attitude is sometimes seen as the result 
of a sum total of qualitatively evaluated beliefs 
(Fishbein and Azjen, 1975), values are the sources of 
these evaluations, standards upon which each individual 
attitude toward objects or situations are based. A 
person has as many attitudes as he has interactions with 
objects or situations; he has only as many values as he 
has learned beliefs concerning desirable modes of be­
havior and end-states of existence.
Most importantly, values are seen to occupy a more 
central position than attitudes in one's own cognitive 
system, and thus are determinants of both attitudes 
and behavior. For Rokeach, the cognitive system main­
tains an inner "core". Functionally organized, around 
this inner core is a hierarchy of cognitive concepts,
The layer most central to the core consists of the 
terminal values which are the individual's beliefs 
concerning desirable end-states of existence. Next 
are the instrumental values which are beliefs concerning 
desirable modes of conduct which are "instrumental" 
in achieving the terminal values. The final layer is 
the individual's attitudes toward relevant objects.
Thus, in the cognitive system it is values, and es­
pecially the terminal values, which are seen to be
6most central to "behavior; specifically, this is because 
they are used as standards of behavior.
Among the instrumental and terminal values, there 
is yet another theoretical differentiation: Morality
values and Competence values. Morality values refer to 
those with an interpersonal focus which, when violated, 
result in feelings of guilt for wrongdoing. Competence 
values are more at an intrapersonal level; their vio­
lation leads to feelings of shame about personal in­
adequacy.
There is, however, something even more central 
which interacts with values to affect attitudes and be­
havior: the self-concept. Rokeach defines the self-
concept as "an organization of all the distinctive cog­
nitions, negative as v/ell as positive, and the affective 
connotations of these cognitions that would be displayed 
if a full answer to the question 'Who am I?' were forth­
coming" (p. 215). The functions served by values essen­
tially converge into one major function: to help maintain
and enhance one's self-concept. Specifically, values 
maintain and enhance an individual's concept of his 
own morality and competence.
We can now see the importance of Rokeach's theory 
within the framework of cognitive consistency. Ac­
cording to Rokeach, all of the various cognitive concepts
7are interdependent. The more central the concept to 
the entire system, the more enduring and far-reaching 
should he its effects on other parts of the system.
For example, a change in an individual's self- 
concept (which, as Rokeach points out, is an aim of 
psychotherapy) leads to a change in functionally related 
terminal values, instrumental values and attitudes, and 
inevitably, in behavior. For example, someone whose 
self-concept were to change from one of dependence to 
one of autonomy might increase the importance of the 
terminal value "A Sense of Accomplishment" in his value 
system. This change should be reflected in behavior 
requiring greater ambition.
Likewise, a change in any one of the cognitive con­
cepts other than self-concept would also lead to changes 
in the other concepts, but these changes would probably 
not be as enduring.
Rokeach feels that psychologists have assumed values 
to be far more resistant to change than attitudes.
This is why the overwhelming preference in the literature 
has been for the study of attitudes over values. Un­
fortunately, changes in attitude appear to be short­
lived because, according to Rokeach, the more central 
values underlying them have been left intact.
Consistency theorists have maintained that change
8takes place when various attitudes or cognitions are 
seen to be inconsistent. This inconsistency results 
in a discomfort of some sort which the person is then 
motivated to relieve. Relief is achieved when an atti­
tude or cognition changes so as to be congruent with 
remaining attitudes or cognitions. Rokeach maintains 
that even though the changed attitude may be more con­
gruent with other attitudes, cognitions or behaviors, 
it may be even more inconsistent with the underlying 
values that have not changed. Rokeach theorizes that 
when attituae-attitude or attitude-cognition inconsis­
tencies are resolved, it creates an even greater at- 
titude-value or cognition-value inconsistency. The 
accompanying tension is therefore even greater than that 
experienced previously. The only way to relieve this 
tension is for the changed attitude to revert back to 
its original position after a short period of time.
This, Rokeach says, is why most attitude change is 
not long-lasting. Changed attitudes are of necessity 
still in conflict with unchanged values.
To achieve permanent attitude change, Rokeach sug­
gests that one must first change the underlying value. 
Values should be subject to change using cognitive 
contradictions in the same way that attitudes change by 
being in contradiction with one’s self-concept.
Rolceach states that "A value should undergo enduring 
change if maintenance or enhancement of self-conception 
is at stake..." (p. 217). If a value is in conflict 
with one's self-concept, the value changes to become con­
sonant with the self-concept, and this value change 
affects attitudes as well as behavior.
The hypothetical motivational construct which 
Rokeach employs in his consistency theory is that of
i
self-dissatisfaction. Any perceived discrepancy between 
self-conceptions and values, attitudes or behavior is 
experienced as a state of self-dissatisfaction. Thus 
Rokeach is postulating that the motivator for change 
is the affective experience of self-dissatisfaction, 
caused by the perception of inconsistency among values, 
attitudes or behaviors. Whenever any of these cognitive 
entities conflict with each other, the one that is at 
odds with the self-concept is the one that will change. 
Thus, if a value and an attitude conflict, the value 
will change if it is not consonant with the self-concept. 
Similarly, if the attitude is not consonant with the self- 
concept, it is the attitude that will change in order 
to become more consistent with the self-concept and the 
value.
Rokeach (1973) outlines four major differences
10
between his and other consistency theories:
1) In Rokeach's theory, cognitive inconsistency is 
seen as a discrepancy between some cognitive element 
and one's self-concept. While other theorists have uti­
lized the self-concept to some extent in their theories 
(Aronson, 1969; Secord and Backman, 1965), the range
of possible discrepancies between the self-concept and 
other cognitive entities has been extended by Rokeach.
2) Rokeach's theory stresses values as a more cen­
tral construct than attitudes for cognitive consistency. 
"A clear distinction between the value and attitude con­
cepts is as indispensable for the behavioral sciences
as the distinction between genes and chromosomes is for 
biology and genetics" (p. 231).
3) Attitude theories tend to predict what are ul­
timately short-term changes. Rokeach's theory is at­
tempting to address itself to long-term change.
4) Implicit in the theory is that behavior change 
should follow value change. Whereas hard evidence con­
cerning behavior change as a result of attitude change 
is relatively rare (Wicker, 1969), the present theory 
predicts that behavior change should result from chan­
ges in the value system.
In his major work in the area, Rokeach (1973) 
confronted subjects with inconsistencies between their 
held values and their self-concept. The techniques used
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to raise individuals' awareness of these inconsistencies 
are referred to as "self-confrontation procedures" and 
are assumed to result in a heightened state of self­
dissatisfaction. In an effort to relieve themselves 
of this negative affective state, Rokeach reasoned, 
subjects would then modify their value systems in such 
a way as to make them more congruent with their self- 
concept. That is, certain values in their value "hier­
archy" would become more important in order to establish 
continuity with their self-concept.
In utilizing the self-confrontation procedure,
Rokeach exposed students to information which was de­
signed to evoke self-dissatisfaction in individuals who 
had ranked the value Equality low in value rankings of 
importa.nce. Equality was selected as a target value 
because previous research had indicated a discrepancy 
between individuals' rankings of Equality and the re­
lated value Freedom.
In previous research at the National Opinion Re­
search Center (NORC), median rankings for Equality, Free­
dom and the other terminal and instrumental values had 
been established for a nationwide sample of subjects.
The median ranking of Equality for the college student 
sample was 3.30, while the median ranking for Freedom 
was 5.38.
Rokeach believed that most subjects in his study, 
who had ranked Equality low relative to the value Free­
dom could be confronted with certain statements imply­
ing inconsistencies between their self-concept and their 
value system. He assumed that most people, especially 
college students, conformed to an American societal 
norm of having an egalitarian self-concept. There­
fore, he suggested to subjects that their low ranking 
of Equality relative to Freedom is basically inconsisten 
with their egalitarian self-concept. He reinforced this 
inconsistency by interpreting the discrepancy in ranking 
to mean that they valued freedom for themselves as more 
important than freedom for others. The self-dissatis­
faction resulting from this perceived inconsistency 
was expected to lead to an increased regard for the 
value Equality, which was in turn expected to lead to 
changes in behaviors reflecting this value.
Subjects were first administered the Terminal 
Value section of the Rokeach Value Survey, Form E.
The Survey is a list of 18 terminal values shown in 
alphabetical order. The 18 values were derived from a 
much larger list, obtained from sources like Rokeach 
himself, 30 graduate students, and 100 adults from 
metropolitan Lansing, Michigan. Values were elimina­
ted by correlating value rankings and removing the
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higher correlated values from the pool. Others were 
eliminated if they did not signify end-states of exis­
tence or were just too specific. The Survey has gone 
through five physical revisions, at one point going 
from 12 to 18 values. Test-retest reliabilities for 
college-age subjects range from about .75-.80, depend­
ing on the form used.
In the Rokeach experimental situation, the subject 
is simply asked to "arrange them (the values) in order 
of their impoi’tance to YOU, as guiding principles in 
YOUR life." Each value is accompanied parenthetically 
by a short definition of the value. The 18 terminal 
values are as follows:
1. A Comfortable life (a prosperous life)
2. An Exciting life (a stimulating, active life)
3. A Sense of Accomplishment (lasting contribution)
4. A World at Peace (free of war and conflict)
5. A V/orld of Beauty (beauty of nature & the arts)
6. Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
7. Family Security (taking care of loved ones)
8. Freedom (independence, free choice)
9. Happiness (contentedness)
10. Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflict)
11. Mature Love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
12. National Security (px’otection from attack)
1'3. Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14
14. Salvation (saved, eternal life)
15. Self-Respect (self-esteem)
16. Social Recognition (respect, admiration)
17. True Friendship (close companionship)
18. Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)
After rank ordering the terminal values, the sub­
jects were shown the median rank ordering of the values 
by 298 Michigan State University students. The fact 
that the value Freedom had been ranked first by the 
sample, and that the value Equality had been ranked 
eleventh was pointed out to the students. It was then 
suggested that seeing Freedom as relatively important and 
Equality as relatively unimportant might be interpreted 
as meaning that someone like that sees his own freedom
as very important but sees others1 freedom as not nearly 
as important. It was in this way that the perceived 
inconsistency between the subjects’ egalitarian self- 
concept and their low value ranking of Equality relative 
to Freedom was to result in self-dissatisfaction.
After spending a few minutes comparing their rankings 
with those of the sample of students, subjects were 
asked if they were or were not in sympathy with the 
aims of civil rights demonstrators. This led to yet 
another attempt to manipulate self-dissatisfaction.
Subjects were then shown a table illustrating the median 
student rankings of the values Freedom and Equality
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as a function of whether or not the sample students 
sympathized with the aims of civil rights demonstrators. 
Based on the data in that table, certain inferences were 
made salient to the subjects:
Students who are strongly for civil rights 
value Equality rather highly— they ranked 
it five; but these against civil rights place 
a much lower value on Equality— they ranked 
it 17 in importance... This raises the ques­
tion whether those who are against civil 
rights are really saying that they care a 
great deal about their own freedom but are 
indifferent to other people's freedom. Those 
who are for civil rights are perhaps really 
saying they not only want freedom for them­
selves but for other people too (p. 238).
Subjects then rated the strength of their agreement 
with this interpretation of the data, as v/ell as their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their own value 
rankings.
Three weeks later, subjects reranked the values. 
Control groups had x'anked the values initially but had 
not been exposed to any of the feedback of others' val­
ues or the inconsistency manipulations.
Again, three to five months after the pretest and 
experimental treatment, all subjects reranked the value
16
list. At about the same time, they also received by mail 
"letters of solicitation", ostensibly from the NAACP 
requesting membership and a one dollar membership fee. 
This solicitation was made again approximately one year 
following the initial one. The responses to the solic­
itations were used as behavioral measures of the impor­
tance of Equality in one's value system.
Rokeach found significant increases in the value 
hierarchy for the values Equality and Freedom in three 
separate studies, the latter two utilizing a third post­
test 15-17 months after the experimental treatment.
In all three studies, median rankings of these values 
by subjects in self-confrontation conditions increased 
significantly from pretest rankings as well as being sig­
nificantly different from the controls. Equality rank­
ings typically increased twice as much as did Freedom 
rankings. In addition, value change remained through 
both three-week and three-month intervals. Significant 
changes in control groups, where found, were in the 
opposite direction. Also, significantly more solic­
itations were answered with contributions in self­
confrontation groups than control groups, although this 
effect was much stronger in the first .posttest than in 
the second or third. Expressed self-dissatisfaction
17
with the way pretest values had been ranked was also 
significantly greater in self-confrontation subjects 
than in controls.
Close examination of the self-confrontation proce­
dure raises questions regarding the precise cause of 
value changes in Rokeach's study. Rokeach's basic 
premise is that the self-confrontation technique raises 
the subject's awareness of inconsistencies between 
cognitions concerning his values and his self-concept.
The awareness of these inconsistent cognitions results 
in self-dissatisfaction, which in turn motivates value 
change in an effort to remove the disparity between 
held values and self-concept. In the procedure section 
of his study, Rokeach states that he attempted to arouse 
this state of self-dissatisfaction in the subjects 
three separate times.
The first attempt to manipulate self-dissatisfaction 
made salient a possible contradiction between self-concept 
and terminal values. Rokeach reasoned that subjects who 
see themselves as equally in favor of freedom for all 
people should logically rank the values Freedom and 
Equality as approximately equal in importance in their 
value systems. If the subjects rank Freedom much higher 
in importance than Equality, then this implies that 
subjects are much more concerned with their own freedom
18
than with anyone else's.
Rokeach confronted his subjects with this logical 
inconsistency by showing them the value rankings obtained 
from 298 college students. The median ranking for 
.Freedom had been 1, that for Equality had been 11.
Rokeach then suggested to his subjects that because 
these students ranked Freedom much higher than Equality, 
they were more interested in their own freedom than 
other people's freedom. Since the subjects had previous­
ly ranked their values in a similar manner, this served 
to suggest an inconsistency in the subject's mind.
That is, he has an egalitarian self-concept, yet Equality 
is not nearly as important a value as is Freedom. 
Theoretically, subjects will relieve the resulting self­
dissatisfaction by changing the importance of this value 
in their value system to make it consistent with their 
egalitarian self-concept. Thus, their ranking of Equal­
ity should increase in importance.
Addressing possible alternative explanations for 
this change, Rokeach raised the possibility of conform­
ity pressure, but argued that conformity would result 
in the maintenance of the original value rankings.
That is, conformity pressure should result in no change 
or a decrease in the importance of Equality since the 
rankings cf values by the 298 sample students essentially
19
agreed with the pretest rankings of the subjects.
However, a self-confrontation procedure should result 
in Equality becoming more important. Thus, Rokeach 
was attempting to establish value change in a direction 
away from the position apparently advocated by the sample 
of MSU students.
Nevertheless, rather than relying on a single manip­
ulation of self-confrontation, Rokeach added a second 
self-dissatisfaction manipulation. This manipulation 
may have, in fact, resulted in group pressure to change 
values in the same direction predicted by Rokeach.
This attempt at arousing self-dissatisfaction was imple­
mented by implying a contradiction between the subject's 
self-concept and his values and attitudes. First, 
the subject committed himself to a position on civil 
rights and demonstrations. Then the subjects were shown 
data depicting value rankings of previous subjects as 
a function of their position on civil rights and demon­
strations. The written description of this data indi­
cated that individuals who were positive toward civil 
rights ranked both Equality and Freedom relatively high 
and close together, while those w'ho felt negatively 
toward civil rights and demonstrations ranked Equality 
much lower than Freedom.
Even though Rokeach maintains that self-dissatis-
20
faction should, result from this information, no inconsis­
tency seems to have been made salient at this point. 
Instead, what seems to be happening is that informa­
tion is being provided regarding a reference group.
The 298 students who originally ranked the values are 
categorized as members of the "strong civil rights 
group", the "middle group", or the "anti-civil rights 
group". In the description of this data, it is pointed 
out to the subjects that the students who were labeled 
as "strongly for civil rights" rank Equality higher 
than the other two groups and closer to Freedom than the 
other two groups. In fact, this pro-civil rights group 
ranked Equality higher than Freedom. Thus, subjects 
were provided information about a reference group and 
how that group ranked Freedom and Equality. As a re­
sult, it is very possible that subjects felt pressure 
to align their values with a positively perceived ref­
erence group (Kelman, 1958), i.e., those strongly for 
civil rights. Therefore, if subjects are changing their 
values as a result of this manipulation, it is not 
clear whether change is due to the arousal of self­
dissatisfaction stemming from the awareness of an in­
consistency between value system and self-concept, or to 
subjects’ attempts to realign their values with and
21
conform to the values of members of a positively perceived 
reference group (or attempts to avoid conforming to a 
negatively perceived reference group).
In the same study, Rokeach made yet another self­
confrontation attempt. In the first manipulation he had 
implied that subjects who differentiated in importance 
between the values Freedom and Equality in their value 
systems were actually being inconsistent with their 
egalitarian self-concept. In the second manipulation, 
he displayed data that merely showed that the people who 
do make this differentiation are those who are not 
sympathetic toward civil rights. In this third manip­
ulation attempt, Rokeach tried to elicit self-dissatis­
faction by establishing a logical inference based on 
these first two premises. If people who rank Equality 
much lower than Freedom are being inconsistent, and if 
data indicate that people who do not strongly favor civil 
rights make this differentiation, then the logical in­
ference is that people who do not strongly favor civil 
rights have value systems inconsistent with their self- 
concept. That is, those who do not strongly favor 
civil rights see their own freedom as more important 
than other people's freedom. Conversely, this conclusion 
implies that people who strongly favor civil rights are 
consistent and value freedom for all people as much as 
they value their owr. He accomplishes all this by sug-
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gesting to subjects that
those who are against civil rights are really- 
saying that they care a great deal about their 
own freedom but are indifferent to other peo­
ple's freedom. Those who are for civil rights 
are perhaps really saying they not only want 
freedom for themselves but for other people 
too (p. 426).
According to Rokeach, those who see themselves as truly 
egalitarian should realize this inconsistency in them­
selves, become dissatisfied with themselves, and change 
their value systems to make Equality closer in impor­
tance to Freedom.
Unfortunately, this third manipulation attempt at 
evoking inconsistency is impossible to utilize without 
first exposing subjects to the data from the reference 
group. Therefore, it seems impossible to tell whether 
the resultant value change is derived from inconsis­
tencies brought to awareness during self-confrontation 
or simply from the subjects' desire to align their values 
with those "most strongly for civil rights".
It might be useful to distinguish between the two 
types of inconsistencies being utilized here. The first 
manipulation .involved an inconsistency derived solely 
from the subject's own value system and self-concept,
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arid that was intrinsic in origin. The last manipulation 
required information about the values of an external source 
or group to establish inconsistency. Thus, it is pos­
sible that such "intrinsic" inconsistencies (as in the 
first manipulation) and "extrinsic" inconsistencies 
(as in the third) would have differential effects on 
value change. That is, only one of these methods of ef­
fecting value change may have actually been responsible 
for the changes in Rokeach's study. But, because the 
effect of each method is never measured separately, 
the type of inconsistency which accounts for this value 
change cannot be specified.
Rokeach maintained that all of the attempts to arouse 
self-dissatisfaction did so in the same way, and by 
inference, are additive. Since Rokeach never specifies 
how much self-dissatisfaction is necessary to evoke value 
change, then apparently any of the above three situations 
should be sufficient to do so. On the other hand, it 
is possible that the entire effect observed by Rokeach 
is not due to self-dissatisfaction at all, but simply 
a result of information about the values of a reference 
group contained in the second self-dissatisfaction 
arousal attempt. It seemed necessarjq therefore, to 
test the individual effects of the specific arousal at­
tempts inds pend ently in order to determine which of
these explanations accounts for his results.
Other studies involving the Rokeach paradigm have 
mostly been done by students and associates of Rokeach, 
and have similarly failed to tease out possible confound- 
ings with group influence. The studies were originally 
conceived in order to specify other modifiable values 
and behaviors.
Rokeach and Cochrane (1972), in a preliminary study, 
found that in conditions both of privacy, in which the 
subject was not closely observed, and non-privacy, in whic 
he was carefully observed, significant increases in the 
value rankings of both Freedom and Equality were found 
from eight to nine weeks after the self-confrontation 
procedure. It had been theorized that value change 
would be minimized in a non-private situation, one which 
would encourage defensiveness in the subject. This was 
not found to be the case. Subjects can indeed undergo 
value change in non-private situations.
In an attempt to find out whether awareness of one's 
own value hierarchy is a precondition for the Rokeach 
effect, Rokeach and McLellan (1972) replicated the 
original Rokeach study but subjects did not complete the 
pre-manipulation Value Survey. They reasoned that self­
feedback of one's values in the form of a pre-test
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might not be necessary since, through the process of 
social comparison, subjects always have access to and 
make use of cognitions concerning their current value 
system. Significant increases in the rankings of both 
Freedom and Equality for the experimental group were 
f'ouna four weeks after the self-confrontation session. 
Similar results were found in a condition that replicated 
the previously discussed (Rokeach, 1975) research.
Rokeach and McLellan (1972) concluded that a pretest 
is not necessary to make subjects’ values salient in 
the self-confrontation procedure.
Rokeach (1975) eliminated human experimenters com­
pletely when he replicated his original findings by us­
ing a computer terminal instead of an experimenter to 
supply feedback. Subjects presented with this feedback 
showed value change two months after the treatment.
The control group showed no such effect. Again, how­
ever, subjects v/ere receiving reference group informa­
tion, and may have changed their values on the basis of 
this group influence.
It is important to note that in the three above- 
mentioned studies, group influence is still a viable 
alternative explanation for the results. The studies 
were basically methodologically similar to the original 
study.
Possible confounding with, reference group influence 
seems especially clear in a related study by Hollen 
(1972). Hollen raised the target value "A World of 
Beauty" in college students merely by pointing out to 
them that "young people and better-educated people tend 
to rank *A World of Beauty’ higher than the general 
public ranks it." Presumably, Rokeach's explanation of 
this finding was that subjects see their low ranking 
of "A World of Beauty" as incompatible with their self- 
concept of being young and well-educated, and somehow 
different from the general population. Reference group 
influence may actually be the main factor responsible 
for the effect, since students may not wish to see them­
selves as deviating from the values of their reference 
group.
To see if value modification would affect smoking 
behavior, Conroy, Katkin and Barnette (1973) increased 
self-control in smokers by suggesting that "people who 
have trouble quitting cigarettes are trying to be broad­
minded about a task that requires rigid self-discipline" 
to subjects who had ranked the value "Broadminded" 
third and "Self-disciplined" eighth. Over a set of 
four blocks of four days each, smokers not only raised 
their rankings of the value "Self-disciplined", but
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maintained a low cigarette consumption of about two 
cigarettes per four day block. This was in comparison 
with a control group whose consumption averaged about 
eight times that amount. For Rokeach, this is strong 
evidence that value change facilitates change of atti­
tudes toward specific behaviors (e.g., quitting smoking). 
However, again, these results may be due to subjects 
feeling the effects of group influence. Subjects see 
themselves as members of the "trying to quit smoking" 
reference group, and thus do whatever they are told 
group members do, i.e., be self-disciplined. It may 
very 'well be that the subjects' desire to act with the 
desired group rather than self-dissatisfaction with their 
value systems that was truly responsible for these ef­
fects.
Finally, Greenstein (1976) attempted to extend the 
research into a field setting using unobtrusive measures. 
Similar to Rokeach (1973), he gave to student teachers 
two sets of data. In one, he depicted the median rank­
ings of the values "Mature Love" and "A Sense of Ac­
complishment" for a sample of Central Michigan University 
student teachers. Overall, this student sample had 
ranked "A Sense of Accomplishment" much higher than 
"Mature love". However, the other table displayed the
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data as a function of their classification as either 
having high or mediocre potential as teachers. "Good" 
teachers ranked "Mature Love" higher than "A Sense of 
Accomplishment", "Mediocre" teachers reversed the 
rankings, putting "A Sense of Accomplishment" ahead of 
"Mature Love". Greenstein suggested to the subjects that 
this data indicated that "good" teachers see mature love as 
more important than a sense of professional accomplish­
ment. Control subjects saw tables depicting median 
rankings of professors of education, and received no 
information about the value systems of good or bad teach­
ers .
Thirteen weeks after the treatment, all of the values 
were ranked by all subjects. The results showed that ex­
perimental subjects ranked "Mature Love" significantly 
higher than controls. In addition, these subjects scored 
higher than controls on a measure of teacher ability 
scored by double blind judges. These judges rated the 
student teachers' abilities on a set of seven dimensions 
including communication skills and overall teaching 
potential. Greenstein suggested that by making the 
value "Mature Love" more important, the subjects became 
more personally concerned with the problems of others 
and less concerned with personal achievement. This
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value change altered the students' attitudes about 
teaching and working with children, which was reflected 
in their behavioral scores.
On the other hand, the influence of the reference 
group could also explain these results. The character­
istics of "good" and "mediocre" teachers were clearly 
specified. So, whether subjects were able to perceive 
the "hypocrisy" of rating "A Sense of Accomplishment" 
above "Mature Love", or whether they were merely influenced 
by the group with which they wished to identify ("good 
teachers") is unclear.
One purpose of this study, then was to attempt to 
determine whether value change is a result of the aware­
ness of inconsistencies between values and/or attitudes 
and self-concept, or of information about the value sys­
tem of a reference group with which the subject iden­
tifies. According to Rokeach, awareness of an inconsis­
tency between values and self-concept is enough to arouse 
self-dissatisfaction and to effect value change. How­
ever, if merely exposing subjects to the value rankings 
of a positively perceived, reference group is sufficient 
to effect change, then much of Rokeach’s work would be 
more parsimoniously explained in terms of social influence 
theory (Reiman, 1958). In terms of this theory, the 
subject comes to identify with the reference group
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because he "wants to establish or maintain a satisfying 
self-defining relationship to another person or group"
(p. 53). One way they maintain or establish this rela­
tionship is by accepting attitudes, opinions, norms and 
values of this reference group. The specific value hier­
archy to which they conform is irrelevant, so long as 
they appear to the person to uphold his position as a 
member of the group. If subjects' values change, then, 
it may be because they wish to conform to the values 
of the reference group of which they perceive themselves 
to be a part.
Of course, once the confounding effect of the ref­
erence group was eliminated as an alternative explanation, 
there was still the possibility that specific types of 
inconsistencies, whether intrinsic or extrinsic could 
be specified. Perhaps the inconsistency must be linked 
up with information concerning a reference group for 
change to be realized. However, Rokeach implies that the 
mere presentation of an intrinsic inconsistency, with 
no mention of a reference group, should be sufficient 
to evoke value change. If only an intrinsic inconsis­
tency is needed, then providing information concerning 
a reference group might be pointless or could even 
serve to interfere with the value change process.
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The second purpose of this study, then, was to attempt 
to specify the differential effects of intrinsic and ex­
trinsic inconsistencies with regard to value change.
In addition, the role of value change in behavior 
change was reexamined. Since Rokeach also states that 
long-term behavioral change can only come about through 
value change, the study of Rokeach's separate self-con­
frontation manipulations was used to determine their 
effects on long-term behavior change.
To determine the factors necessary to produce value 
change and behavioral change, this study was composed 
of five conditions: 1) an Intrinsic Inconsistency (II)
condition, comprising Rokeach’s first attempt to arouse 
self-dissatisfaction by pointing out a simple inconsis­
tency between values and self-concept; 2) a Reference 
Group only (RG) condition, exposing subjects only to 
data which identify value rankings of positively perceived 
and negatively perceived reference groups; 3) an Ex­
trinsic Inconsistency (El) condition, in which subjects 
were provided with information on the value rankings of 
a reference group and an inconsistency confrontation 
based on the reference group’s values; 4) a Replication 
(R) condition, which exposed subjects to all three of 
Rokeach’s orjginal arousal manipulations, and 5) a 
Control (C) condition which did not involve self­
confrontation or reference group information of any kind. 
Value change was measured by subjects' rankings on the 
Rokeach Value Survey. Since Rokeach states that value 
change also results in long-term behavior change, a 
measure of behavioral intention was made by telephone 
two weeks after the value ranking procedure, as well as 
a behavioral measure of value change.
It was, of course, expected that condition R, the 
Replication condition, would result in significant value 
change, since all three manipulations expected to produce 
change were present. This was also intended to confirm 
the effects of Rokeach's overall procedure on value change 
The patterns of results for other conditions were to be 
used to either support Rokeach's theory, modify it, 
or support reference group influence as an alternative 
explanation:
1) Self-confrontation theory would predict that the 
two inconsistency conditions, II and El, would result 
in greater value change than in the Control condition.
So both II and El should each produce self-dissatisfac­
tion because these conditions contain self-confrontation 
procedures which make subjects aware of inconsistency
between self-concept and values and/or attitudes. Thus
10
it was reasoned that value change in conditions II and 
El would confirm the predictions of self-confrontation
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theory.
2) If the conditions involving self-confrontation, 
i.e., R, II and El, showed greater value change than 
conditions RG and G, then Rokeach's explanation of the 
data would be supported. The former three conditions 
all contain inconsistency manipulations, designed to 
evoke self-dissatisfaction with subjects1 value systems, 
while conditions RG and C do not. Thus, if only those 
conditions which included inconsistency manipulations 
were successful in bringing about value change, self­
confrontation would apparently be a necessary condition 
for change. The reference group explanation would then 
be’ a less viable alternative explanation.
3) If conditions containing reference group data,
R, RG and El showed greater value change than conditions 
that did not, II and 0, then this would be evidence that 
reference group influence is a viable explanation for the 
value change found by Rokeach (1973). In this case, 
subjects could be sa.id to have responded to the social 
influence pressure of a positively perceived reference 
group. The group influence explanation would be seen
to be more parsimonious because if group RG, which 
contained subjects being exposed only to reference group 
data, showed value change equivalent to the R or El 
conditions, then the need for an inconsistency manipula­
tion would have been obviated.
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4) Comparison of the two inconsistency conditions,
II and El, would provide a test of the relative strengths 
of intrinsic and extrinsic inconsistencies. If extrin­
sic inconsistencies have stronger effects than intrinsic 
inconsistencies, then more needs to be done to under­
stand the interrelationship, if any, between group in­
fluence and inconsistency effects. That is, what does 
group influence do to assure value change through confron­
tation of inconsistency? If intrinsic inconsistencies 
have stronger effects than do extrinsic inconsistencies, 
then Rokeach1s model of value modification can be oper­
ationally simplified and be better understood in terms
of self-dissatisfaction with one's value system per se.
That is, if self-dissatisfaction can be caused by self­
confrontation not involving group influence, then that 
one maniptilation, based on inconsistency between one's 
own values and self-concept, is the major force involved 
in change.
5) Finally, the question of whether the- changing
of values is responsible for long-term behavioral change 
was evaluated. Behavior change was hypothesized to be 
either a by-product of the value change effected by 
reference group influence, or a naturp.1 extension of 
value change, which had resulted from awareness of in­
consistency and self-dissatisfaction.
In summary, existing attempts to demonstrate the 
validity of Rokeach's theory have failed to eliminate 
the possible confounding effect of reference group in­
fluence. Are subjects really seeing themselves as hypo­
critical, and experiencing inconsistencies, or do they 
just want to be like "everybody else"? The major ques­
tion in this study, then, was whether or not reference 
group theory can explain Rokeach's results. In addition, 
this study attempted to isolate the specific manipula­
tions combined by Rokeach in trying to arouse self­
dissatisfaction, and to assess their impact indepen­
dently on value and behavior change.
Method
Subjects
Subjects v/ere 207 undergraduates from lower-level 
psychology and education classes. All subjects were 
run in the classroom situation.
Materials
Materials consisted of the Rokeach Value Survey,
Form E. Form E of the Survey is simply an alphabetical 
listing of the 18 terminal values derived by Rokeach. 
Subjects are usually required to enter numbers to the 
left of the values to reflect the rank-ordering they 
wish represented. Form E has demonstrated a test- 
retest reliability of .7 4 , which has remained stable over 
varying time periods as well as over populations (Ro­
keach, 1973).
Procedure
There were three phases to the study, each sep­
arated by two-week periods. Subjects were told at the 
beginning of the Phase I session, and reminded at its 
conclusion, that they had to be present at both of the 
sessions in order to get credit for participation.
Phase I of the study involved the manipulation itself, 
Phase II was the posttest, and Phase III consisted of the 
behavioral), measures.
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Phase I . Subjects were assigned to one of five 
conditions by the random distribution of "Survey pack­
ets". Each subject packet was marked in order to iden­
tify the experimental condition. The subjects were told 
that the study had to do with human values, and they 
were asked to follow the instructions in the packet very 
carefully. Subjects were assured that all information 
they provided as well as all survey data would be kept 
in confidence. There were five conditions:
1. In the Replication (R) condition, subjects were 
essentially presented with the three manipulations used 
in Rokeach’s original study (Rokeach, 1973)* The issue 
of equal rights for women was substituted for the civil 
rights issue in order to make the manipulation more 
relevant to subjects in 1979.
Subjects v/ere first exposed to a fictional presen­
tation of a median rank ordering of values by "recent 
LSU graduates". An interpretation of this data was 
suggested, with the implication of an intrinsic incon­
sistency. Subjects were then asked to assess this inter­
pretation. The instructions read as follows:
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Value Survey 
This is a scientific study of value systems.
There are no right or wrong answers in this study. The 
best answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we 
have already found out about the value systems of LSU 
students. I am sure that many of you would like to know 
what they are. Below is a list of 18 values in alpha­
betical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative im­
portance of these values to the LSU student population. 
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students 
here recently. These students were asked to place a 1 
next to the value which they thought most important to 
them, a 2 next to the value which they thought second most 
important, etc. The value which they thought least 
important was ranked 18th.
The numbers you see next to the values are the 
average ranking received by each value from all the 
students. Please examine the list carefully.
_1 JL ^  Comfortable Life (a prosperous life)
1g An Exciting Life (a stimulating, active life)
6 A Sense of Accomplishment (lasting contribution)
1Q A World at Peace (free of war and conflict)
17 A World of Beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)
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11 Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
9 Family Security (taking care of loved ones)
 1__ Freedom (independence, free choice)
2 Happiness (contentedness)
8 Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflict)
 5_ Mature Love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
16 National Security (protection from attack)
18 Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14 -Salvation (saved, eternal life)
15 Social Recognition (respect, admiration)
 _4_ Self-Respect (self-esteem)
7 True Friendship (close companionship)
 3_ Wisdom (mature understanding of life)
One of the most interesting findings here is that the 
students, on the average, felt that Freedom was very 
important.--they ranked it 1; but they felt that Equality 
was considerably less important— they ranked it 11. 
Apparently, LSU students value freedom far more highly 
than they value equality. This suggests that LSU stu­
dents in general are much more interested in their own 
freedom than they are in freedom for other people.
Think about this for a few moments. How strongly 
do you agree with this interpretation?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree
(Check one)
We have one other finding which we think is unusu­
ally interesting. In order to make this finding more 
meaningful to you personally, you should first answer 
honestly the following question on women's rights:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters 
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
  Yes, and I have personally worked for the Amendment.
  Yes, hut I have not personally worked for the
Amendment.
 No.
The 298 students who participated in the previous 
study of value systems were asked this same question.
They were divided into three groups, according to how they 
responded. The table below shows the average rankings 
of the values Freedom and Equality for each of these 
three groups.
AVERAGE RANKINGS OF FREEDOM &
EQUALITY BY LSU STUDENTS
Yes, worked for ERA Yes, didn't work for No 
ERA
Freedom
Equality
6
5
1 
11
2
17
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Notice in the table that:
1. Pro- and anti- ERA students all value freedom 
relatively highly. Of 18 values all groups rank Freedom 
among the top six.
2. Students who are strongly for ERA value Equality 
rather highly— they ranked it 5. But those against
ERA place a much lower value on Equality— they ranked it 
17. Those who are sympathetic hut non-participants 
ranked Equality 11.
Apparently, both freedom and equality are important 
to some people, while to others freedom is very important 
but equality is not. This raises the question whether 
those who are against ERA are really saying that they care 
a great deal about their own freedom but are indifferent 
to other people’s freedom. Those who are for ERA 
are perhaps really saying they not only want freedom 
for themselves but for other people too. What do you 
think?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
1 strongly (check one) I strongly
agree with this interpretation. disagree.
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This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to be 
valid in this study, you must be here for the second 
phase which will be in two weeks. We thank you and 
hope this has been an interesting and instructive ex­
perience for you.
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Subjects' agreement with the experimental manip­
ulation messages was measured to assure that subjects 
did not undergo value change merely because they agreed 
with the persuasive message, but because they had ex­
perienced cognitive inconsistency.
Exposure of subjects to the table of 18 values 
with the sample median rankings, as well as the ac­
companying message amounted to the intrinsic inconsis­
tency manipulation. Exposure to the ranking-ERA data 
with accompanying analysis and interpretation made up 
the extrinsic inconsistency manipulation. Here, it 
was suggested that those with attitudes against ERA 
held inconsistent values, while those subjects who 
were pro-ERA held values which are consistent,
2. In the Intrinsic Inconsistency (II) condition, 
subjects were exposed to the first of Rokeach's three 
manipulations. That is, they saw the list of median rank­
ings of the 298 LSU students for all 18 values and read 
the interpretation suggesting that these students are 
more interested in freedom for themselves than they are 
for other people. Then, they indicated to what extent 
they agreed or disagreed with this interpretation.
They also indicated their attitudes regarding ERA.
They did not see any data depicting these students' 
value rankings categorized by positions on the ERA
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question. Nor were they exposed to the manipulation 
of extrinsic inconsistency,(see Appendix A).
3. In the Reference Group only (RG) condition, 
subjects received the same initial instructions as the 
two groups above, except that the median rankings of the 
LSU student sample was not given. Instead, subjects 
were informed that the values had been ranked previously 
by a group of LSU students, and then the list of values 
and definitions was presented without the median rankings. 
They then made an attitudinal commitment on the ERA 
question. following this, subjects were shown the table 
of median rankings for the student sample, tabulated 
for each of the three positions: I support ERA and have 
worked for its passage, 1 support ERA but have not worked 
for it, or I do not support ERA. This table indicated 
that students who support and worked for ERA ranked 
Equality 5, those who supported it but did not work 
for it ranked Equality 11, and those against ERA ranked 
it 17. In addition, it was specifically pointed out 
that subjects who support ERA rank Equality high, while 
those opposed to ERA rank Equality relatively low. 
Conceptually, subjects were being informed of typical val­
ue rankings for various reference groups, including a
'J
group they perceived positively and one they perceived 
negatively. There was no manipulation of inconsistency 
(see Appendix B) .
4. The Extrinsic Inconsistency (El) condition 
subjects were exposed to the identical initial instruc­
tions as the RG- condition, including the value list with­
out rankings. They made an attitudinal commitment on 
ERA, and then saw not only the table of median rankings 
of the values as a function of the sample students' 
positions on ERA, but also, unlike the RG condition,
a self-eonfrontative interpretation of this data. It 
suggested that those who are against ERA are really say­
ing that they care a great deal about their own freedom 
but are indifferent to the freedom of other people, and 
that those who are for ERA are saying they not only want 
freedom for themselves, but for other people too.
Subjects then stated their agreement with the interpret­
ation on an 11-point scale (see Appendix C).
5. Control subjects got the same introductory 
information as the two groups above, and made an atti­
tudinal commitment on ERA. Eo data were shown them, 
nor were any implications made. At that point, control 
subjects rank ordered the values on the Value Survey. 
These data sei-ved as the basis of comparison with the 
posttest scores of the experimental groups.
Phase II. All subjects completed the Rokeach 
Value Survey, Eorm P; (see Appendix D). Afterwards, all
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subjects were told:
This is the end of the study. The purpose 
and results of the study will be explained 
to you in class, after all the results have 
been analyzed, probably in a few weeks.
Thank you for your participation.
Phase III. In an effort to assess the behavioral 
impact of the treatments, an attempt was made to contact 
all subjects who had responded favorably on the ERA 
question by telephone two weeks after the posttest.
A female experimental confederate made the following 
solicitation:
Hello, is this ____ ? This is ____ .
I am working for the League of Women Voters 
of Baton Rouge. We're trying to find out by 
telephone survey how the citizens feel about 
the Equal Rights Amendment. Could you tell 
me whether or not you support the Amendment?
(If for it) We have prepared some letters on 
behalf of the ERA which we'd like to send to 
state legislators. All you have to do is to 
sign the letter and send it in to us.
Would you be willing to do that?
Thank you. Goodbye.
47
Subjects who responded with either an intent to 
sign the letter or an "undecided" were sent the following 
letter on plain stationery, along with a stamped envelope 
addressed to the local office of the League of Women 
Voters, and labeled "ERA Project":
November 25, 1979
Dear Louisiana Legislator,
I would like to urge you to support the 
Equal Rights Amendment passage in the Louisiana 
Legislature. A "yes" vote for ERA would insure 
a majority of our population equal participa­
tion in American society. Women, like their 
male counterparts, should be judged by the 
law as individuals, not as a class of inferior 
beings. It is important to note that the only 
kind of sex discrimination which ERA would 
forbid is that which exists in law. Inter­
personal relationships and customs of chivalry 
will remain as they always have been, a matter 
of choice. Indeed, it would give new dignity 
to these important roles by confirming equality 
of rights regardless of sex, and upholding 
an individual's right to choose his/her place 
in society.
48
As a legislator (sic), I encourage your vigorous 
and effective support of the Equal Rights Amend­
ment in words and in action.
Sincerely yours,
The subjects were also sent the following cover let­
ter on League stationery, which was signed by the local 
chapter president:.
November 12, 1979
Lear Friend,
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak 
to our representative the other evening.
Enclosed you will find a letter,,copies of 
which we are sending out to other ERA sup­
porters like yourself throughout the state.
We would like you to please sign the letter 
and send it back to us in the accompanying 
stamped, self-addressed envelope. There are 
certain time constraints on us, so please try 
to send the letter back to us _no later than 
Monday, November 19. All letters received 
will be forwarded together to various leaders 
in the Louisiana House and Senate, as well as 
to other legislators. Thank you so much for
your support. Working together we can win! 
Sincerely,
Marilyn P. Barfield 
President
The two measures employed to evaluate the effec 
value change on Behavior were:
1. the differential rate of the response 
of intent to sign the letter over the 
five conditions, and
2. the actual differential rate of return 
of signed letters to the League office.
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Results
A total of 207 students in three classes completed 
both Phases I and. II of the study. Of these, a total 
of 115 subjects (56%), when asked if they supported 
the ERA, responded, "Yes, but I have not worked for 
the Amendment.1' One student responded that she both 
supported and had worked for the Amendment, and 91 
students (44%) reported that they did not support the 
Amendment. Since only those who supported the ERA 
but had not worked for it were deemed acceptable as 
subjects to test the present hypotheses, the data obtained 
from the students in the latter two categories were not 
included in the analysis. In addition, to counteract 
any potential biasing effect of the comparatively large 
female/male ratio in the Control condition, six females 
were randomly drawn from the Control condition and 
excluded from the analysis. Attempts were made to 
recontact only the remaining 109 subjects for Phase 
III. Of these 109 subjects employed in the analysis,
60 (56%) were females while 49 (44%) were males. The 
cell frequencies according to sex are recorded in Table 
1 .
To confirm the relative stability of rankings over 
time, a t-test was performed to determine whether or not 
there v/as a significant difference between pretest and
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Table 1
Cell Frequencies by Sex and Condition
Condition Females Males
El 12 8
II 10 10
R 14 11
EG 11 12
C 13  8
60 49
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posttest rankings for the Control group. Mean Equality 
scores for pretest (x = 11.81) were not significantly 
different from posttest rankings (x = 10.90), t (20) =
0.97, p - .34. Similarly, mean Freedom scores for 
pretest (x = 5.95) did not differ significantly from 
posttest scores (x = 6.19), t (20) = -.30, p = .77.
Thus rankings of Equality and Freedom appear to be stable 
over time when no intervention occurs. For the remainder 
of the analysis, pretest scores for the Control condition 
were utilized since they, as in other conditions, were 
subjects' first exposure to the ranking task.
Means and standard deviations were calculated for 
subjects' post-manipulation rankings of the values Equal­
ity and Freedom (see Table 2).
Analyses of variance were performed on the value 
data. The analysis was designed to answer certain 
research questions by comparing means of value ranking 
scores.
Rather than testing an overall main effect with a 
one-way analysis of variance, a series of four a priori 
contrasts were performed on the ranking data. The re­
sults of these contrasts are found in Table 3.
First, if Rokeach's theory were correct, it was 
expected that mean rankings in the Replication (R) 
condition would be significantly higher than in the
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of 
Value Rankings
Condition
Replication Mean S.D. n
Equality 10.56 3.94 25
Freedom 5.84 4.34 25
intrinsic Inconsistency
Equality 8.40 5.14 20
Freedom 5.75 4.83 . 20
Reference Group only
Equality 10.78 4.87 23
Freedom 5.96 5.47 23
ixtrinsic Inconsistency
Equality 11.10 5.42 20
Freedom 7.05 4.27 20
ontrol
Equality 11 .90 4.13 21
Freedom 5.95 3.94 21
v
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance:
Equality
Source (Contrast)
BG + Control vs. others 
II + Control vs. others 
El vs. II 
K vs. Control 
Error
df MS F 2
1 45.71 2.07 .15
1 11.16 0.51 .48
1 72.90 3.30 .07
1 20.64 0.93 .34
104 22.08
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Control (C) condition. The Control group had been ex­
posed to no self-confrontation manipulation, while the 
R condition subjects had apparently been exposed to three 
self-confrontation manipulations. When this hypothesis 
was tested by a contrast between the R and C conditions, 
no differences were found, F (1, 104) = 0.93, p = .34. 
However, it will be noted from Table 2 that the means 
(xp•= 10.56, x^ = 11.90) were in the expected direction; 
the mean rank for the R condition was higher than the 
mean rank for the G condition.
Secondly, based on Rokeach’s theory, it was pre­
dicted that those conditions containing self-confronta­
tions would have significantly higher value rankings 
than those that did not. That is, the combined mean 
ranking of conditions II, El and R should be signif­
icantly higher than the mean ranking of conditions 
EG- and 0. This contrast provides a direct test of the 
overall difference between conditions containing self­
confrontation manipulations and those that do not.
Although the means were again in the expected di­
rection (xT-r .-,T -0 = 10.06, xD- n 11.31), the contrastII+EI+H Rbr+C ’
was not significant, 1 (1, 104) = 2.07, p = .15.
Thus the results predicted by Self-confrontation theory 
were not supported,
The alternative explanation for the results of
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Rokeach’s research was based on the influence of ref­
erence groups. If this explanation were valid, subjects 
would not so much have experienced self-dissatisfaction 
from self-confrontation, but rather, identified with a 
positively perceived reference group, about which in­
formation was given in conditions R, RG- and El. Thus, 
it was predicted that conditions containing information 
from potential reference groups, i.e., R, RG- and El, 
to have mean rankings that were significantly higher 
than those that did not, i.e., conditions II and C.
Again, no significant effect was found for this con­
trast, E (1,104) = 0.51» P = .48. In fact, the means 
were nearly identical; the combined means for reference 
group conditions was 10.79, while that for non-reference 
group conditions was 10.19. Thus, no evidence was 
found for the influence of reference groups in the 
Rokeach paradigm.
It was postulated that intrinsic and extrinsic 
inconsistencies might differ in their impact upon value 
change. bhen II was compared to El, the difference 
approached significance, F (1, 104) = 3-30, p = .07; 
the Intrinsic Inconsistency condition had the greater' 
impact on the ranking of the value Equality, as can 
be seen in Table 2, the mean of the II condition 
(x = 8.4) represents the highest ranking, and the mean 
of the El condition (x = 11.1) represents the next to
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lowest ranking of Equality (the lowest being that of 
the Control condition).
Based on these findings, three additional post-hoc 
comparisons were made, utilizing Dunn's Bonferroni t 
(Dunn, 1961). First, the II condition was compared to 
the Control condition in an effort to ascertain the 
impact, if any, of the intrinsic inconsistency manip­
ulation on value change. It was found that the II con­
dition (x = 8.4) had a significantly higher mean ranking 
than the Control condition (x = 11.9), Fpurm (1, 104) =
6.03, p <  .05. Secondly, in order to determine the 
possible effect of the extrinsic inconsistency manip­
ulation, the El condition (x = 11.1) was compared with 
the Control condition, but no significant difference 
was found, F-j)Urm 0 »  104) = .32, p = n.s. Thus it was 
concluded that the intrinsic inconsistency manipulation 
had effected value change, while the extrinsic incon­
sistency manipulation had not.
An additional comparison was performed to determine 
if the Reference Croup only condition had undergone 
value change. Again, no significant difference was found,
F n (1, 104) = 0.62, p = n.s.Dunn v r ' ’ *
To summarize the results of the analysis of the
value Equality, the order of mean rankings in decreasing 
order were:
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Intrinsic Inconsistency (II), Replication (R), Reference 
Group only (RG), Extrinsic Inconsistency (El) and fi­
nally, the Control condition. The ranking of Equality 
was found to be significantly higher in the II con­
dition than in the Control condition. No other con­
ditions differed significantly from the Control condition, 
but the difference between the II and El conditions did 
approach significance.
Since, as previously reported, it was necessary to 
exclude six females at random from the Control condition, 
a statistical analysis was done in order to insure that 
results were not due to the unequal distributions of males 
and females across conditions. That is, it was neces­
sary to confirm that the difference between the II and 
Control conditions was not due to the disproportionate­
ly greater number of females than males in the Control 
condition. The analysis was accomplished by performing 
a test of simple effects. In a pair of contrasts the 
II condition was compared to the Control condition for 
female subjects, and then again for male subjects.
It was reasoned that if the II condition differed from 
the C condition only for females and not for males, 
then there would be reason to believe that the differ­
ential frequency of males and females in the II and C 
conditions might be confounding the effect of the manip­
ulation. Ironically, when the contrasts were performed,
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it was found that it was the males in the II condition, 
rather than the females,that showed significantly higher 
rankings than those in the Control condition. For 
males, the mean ranking for Equality in the II condi­
tion (x = 7.9) was significantly higher than that of 
the controls (x = 13.0). Thus clearly, the dispropor­
tionate number of females in the Control•coadition 
in no way contributed to the significant difference be­
tween the II and C conditions in the value ranking of 
Equality.
The experimental manipulations were not expected 
to affect the value Freedom, as Freedom was seen as the 
more stable value. To confirm this, an analysis iden­
tical to that performed on the Equality data was per­
formed on the Freedom data (see Table 4). As can be 
seen from the table, none of the contrasts either achieved 
or approached significance. Post-hoc comparisons ana­
logous to those in the Equality analysis were performed, 
and again no significant results were found. II com­
pared to the Control condition yielded no significant 
difference, P n . (1, 104) = 0.02, p > .10. Similar-
ly, the comparison of El vs. C as well as that of RG 
vs. 0 were both not significant. Apparently, there 
was no impact of self-confrontation or reference gx'oup 
influence on ranking of the value Freedom.
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance:
Freedom
Source (Contrast)
RG- + Control vs. others 
II + Control vs. others 
El vs. II 
R vs. Control 
Error
df MS F £
1 1.75 0.08 .77
1 4.73 0.22 .64
1 16.90 0.79 .37
1 0.14 0.01 .93
104 21 .27
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Additionally, for the El and II conditions, Pearson 
Product-Moment correlations were calculated to determine 
the relationships between the value rankings and measures 
of subject agreement with the arguments contained in the 
confrontation manipulations. In Rokeach's (1973) study 
this analysis had been conducted in order to insure that 
value change occurred because subjects experienced self- 
dissatisfaction, and not because they agreed with the 
persuasive message. He found that overall, experimental 
subjects changed value rankings regardless of whether or 
not they agreed with the message, i.e., no correlation 
between value rankings and agreement was found.
In this study subjects indicated the magnitude of 
their agreement with the data interpretation supplied in 
the material. The Likert-type scale ranged from "I 
strongly agree with this interpretation" (1) to "I 
strongly disagree with this interpretation" (11).
Analysis revealed that in the El condition subject agree­
ment with the interpretation correlated significantly 
with value rankings of Equality, r (19) = .56, p = .01. 
Conversely, in the II condition, subject agreement with 
the message interpretation did not correlate with value 
rankings of Equality, r (19) = -.12, p = n.s. For the 
value Freedom, neither rankings of El or II conditions 
correlated significantly with subject agreement, r ’s (19) 
- .15 and .01, respectively.
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Finally, there was an attempt to determine the 
relationship between subjects' rankings of Equality 
and relevant behavioral measures. Rokeach (1973) 
had originally predicted that any change in values effec­
ted by self-confrontation manipulations would itself 
effect a change in behavior relevant to that value.
It was also expected that any change resulting from 
reference group pressure would also result in behavior 
change, since subjects* behavior would tend to be consis­
tent with newly changed values.
The behavioral measures included a statement of 
intent to sign a pro-ERA letter, and the actual return 
of that letter by mail to league of Women Voters head­
quarters. Only 76 of 109 subjects were successfully 
contacted by phone by the experimenter’s assistant.
Of these, 59 said they would sign the letter (positive 
intent), 12 said they would not (negative intent), and 
five were undecided and wanted to see the letter before 
committing themselves. 14 of 15 subjects from the II 
condition made known positive intentions, 13 of 17 did so 
from the RG condition, 12 of 14 from the R condition,
11 of 14 from the Control condition and 9 of 16 from the 
El condition.
Unfortunately, expected frequencies in 67% of the 
cells were below five, and thus a 3 X 5 Chi-square test 
of independence was decided against. Subsequently,
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a chi-square test corrected, .for continuity was performed 
on a contingency table containing frequencies of "Yes" 
responses compared with "No" and "Undecided" responses. 
Since, apparently, only the II condition resulted in 
value change, the test compared the II condition with
all other conditions. No significant effect was found,
3
= 0,15, p = n.s. A Fisher Exact test was then done 
to compare the frequencies of the II and Control con­
ditions. Again, no significant relationship was found.
The purpose of measuring the return rate of the 
letters was to further gauge the extent of commitment to 
the ERA as a function of value change. Of 64 letters 
sent to those subjects who had stated their intent to 
sign the letters, 23 were returned to the League office 
signed, and 41 were never returned. No letters were 
returned by subjects who had been "Undecided1s" with 
respect to intent to sign. Seven of 14 subjects in the 
II condition returned signed letters, five of 15 in the 
RG- condition, four of nine in the El condition, four of 
11 in the Control condition and three of 12 in the 
Replication condition. Since most of the expected values 
for the cell frequencies were below five, no analysis 
could be performed on this measure. Nevertheless, it 
is noteworthy that the II condition had both highest 
proportion of intent as well as highest proportion of 
returns of all five conditions.
Discussion
This study attempted to evaluate the self-confront­
ation hypothesis described by Rokeach (1973) in the 
light of an alternative interpretation of value change 
based on reference group influence as suggested by the 
work of Xelman (1958) and others. Certain alternatives 
were put forth and examined.
Rokeach (1973) found that subjects’ value rank­
ings for the value Equality increased significantly when 
subjects were exposed to a self-confrontation manipula­
tion. Virtually this same manipulation, with the ex­
ception of the issue employed (ERA as opposed to civil 
rights) was used in an attempt to replicate Rokeach's 
findings. It was predicted that if Rokeach’s theory 
were valid, then the Replication (R) condition would 
have a significantly higher mean ranking for Equality 
than would the Control (C) condition. This was not 
found to be the case, as no significant difference was 
found. Thus the present study was not successful in 
replicating Rokeach's (1973) findings.
In seeking to discuss the implications of this 
inability to replicate Rokeach's result, it may be use­
ful to consider possible "dynamics" of the effects of 
Rokeach-type manipulations on subjects. For example, 
rather than adding to the impact of a previous inconsis­
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tency manipulation, an extrinsic inconsistency manip­
ulation might actually detract from the overall effect.
The present data would seem to support this contention.
Even though the presence of an intrinsic inconsistency 
successfully elicited value change in the II condition, 
this same manipulation had a negligible effect in the 
Replication condition. Apparently, the extrinsic incon­
sistency manipulation in the R condition served to 
somehow neutralize or counteract the impact of the in­
trinsic inconsistency.
A possible explanation for the absence of value 
change in the Replication condition would be simply an 
excess of information. Subjects being presented with 
both data tables (which Rokeach himself admits are hard­
ly very stimulating to college studenxs) and both con­
frontation manipulations may have been less able to 
comprehend the logical connections between the self­
dissatisfaction arguments and their implications for 
the value rankings of Freedom and Equality.
Another reason why the El component of the Repli­
cation manipulation may have hindered value change 
is that the issue of ERA may not be as conceptually close 
to the value Equality as was the issue of civil rights 
for Rokeach’s subjects. That is, civil rights may be 
a more defensible issue for subjects, and they would be
more likely to develop self-dissatisfaction over their 
perceived inconsistency with this issue, then with ERA.
It is noteworthy that Rokeach*s study was done at 
a time and location which may have been conducive to the 
kind of value modification which Rokeach was attempting. 
At a more liberal institution such as Michigan State, 
in the time of the late 6G’s, the extrinsic inconsis­
tency involving ERA might well have had a significantly 
greater impact than it did on this relatively conserv­
ative campus. That is, the ERA argument might be more 
likely to create self-dissatisfaction at a more liberal 
institution.
Reference group influence was postulated as a pos­
sible alternative explanation for the results of Rokeach* 
test of his theory. According to Kelman (1958) and 
ethers, subjects may be said to respond to the social 
influence pressure of a positively perceived reference 
group. If subjects exposed only to reference group 
data and not to a self-confrontation manipulation showed 
value change equivalent to the R or El conditions, then 
the need for an inconsistency manipulation and resultant 
self-dissatisfaction would be obviated. It was thus 
predicted that if the reference group theory were valid, 
then the combined mean of conditions R, RG and El (the 
three conditions containing reference group material)
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would show a significantly higher ranking than would 
the mean of conditions II and Control (which do not con­
tain any reference group material). This, too was not 
found to he the case as the contrast was not significant. 
When the RG condition was independently compared with 
the Control condition, it also was not found to differ 
significantly, although the rankings were in the predicted 
direction. It appears that this study provides little 
evidence for a Reference Group interpretation of the 
Rokeach paradigm. That is, there are no indications 
from the present data that reference group influence 
alone results in value change.
The qualitative differences between intrinsic ana 
extrinsic inconsistencies suggested that they might have 
differential impacts on value change. Extrinsic incon­
sistencies emphasize the role of group influence in the 
modification of subjects' values. Intrinsic inconsis­
tencies appear free of sources of group influence.
In fact, the II condition is seen as the purest and most 
direct self-confrontation manipulation presented in Ro­
keach 's original persuasive communication material; 
operationally, it is closest to Rokeach’s theoretical 
concepts. Comparing the effects of these manipulations 
could therefore be seen as another indirect comparison 
of the Geli-confrontation and Reference Group explanations 
of the original Rokeach findings.
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Explicit in Rokeach's theory is the notion that 
any self-confrontation procedure which makes subjects 
aware of inconsistencies between self-concept and values 
should result in self-dissatisfaction and thus value 
change. Both the Extrinsic and Intrinsic Inconsistency 
conditions contained self-confrontation manipulations 
utilized by Rokeach, and thus were both theoretically 
capable of eliciting value change. It was therefore 
predicted that both the El and II-conditions would show 
higher value rankings than the Control condition, if 
Rokeach's theory were correct. The II condition was 
indeed significantly higher, while the El condition 
was not. The difference between the II and El condi-r- 
ticns approached significance. The comparison of the 
El condition with the II condition indicated that the 
II condition contained the highest of the five mean 
rankings, while the El condition had the lowest ranking 
of the four experimental conditions; the only condition 
with a lower ranking was the Control condition. The 
results suggest that the II manipulation had a positive 
impact on value change while the El manipulation had 
little or no effects.
The results strongly suggest that contrary to Ro­
keach's implication that self-confrontation manipula­
tions are additive, this does not appear to be so.
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following his first self-confrontation manipulation 
(our II), Rokeach felt it necessary to "arouse an 
additional state of dissatisfaction" (Rokeach, 1973, 
p. 237), by adding what amounted to our El manipulation.
Yet the only condition that was found to effect value 
change was the one with only a single self-dissatisfac­
tion-arousing message. The II condition's single manip­
ulation was more effective than was the R condition’s 
two .
Apparently, not all "seif-confrohtation" manipula­
tions effectively make differences between the value 
system and self-concept salient enough to have an .impact 
on value change. In this case, an extrinsic inconsistency, 
which utilised information about the values of an exter­
nal source in order to point out the inconsistency, was 
net. successful in eliciting value change. On the other 
hand, an intrinsic inconsistency, which was derived from 
subjects' own value systems and self-concepts, success­
fully effected an increase in the importance of the value 
Equality. Thus it would seem that Rokeach's theory 
could be modified to emphasize the impact of intrinsic 
inconsiscencies which are devoid of the apparently in­
effectual use of information concerning the values of 
external sources.
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Curiously, the data indicated a significant pos­
itive correlation, for El subjects, between value rank­
ings of Equality and subjects' agreement with the El 
message. This agreement measure was used as a device by 
Rokeach to insure that subjects were actually feeling 
self-dissatisfaction, as opposed to becoming convinced 
by the veracity of the message. Here, apparently, the 
few subjects in this condition who changed did so as a 
result of the persuasive influence of the message, which 
is what Rokeach assumed would not happen. Rokeach (1973) 
has pointed out that "Significant changes in values and 
attitudes were found about as often and to about the 
same extent among experimental subjects, regardless of 
variations in their...agreement with the experimenter's 
interpretation..." (p. 300).
Eor II subjects, a non-significant negative corre­
lation was found between value rankings of Equality and 
subjects' agreement with the II manipulation. It may 
be inferred from this that the higher mean ranking in 
this condition was not a result of subjects' being 
convinced of the veracity of the II argument. In fact, 
there was no relationship between agreement and value 
change. Therefore, indications are that only the II 
condition subjects underwent self-dissatisfaction and 
this self-dissatisfaction was responsible for the value 
change. Subjects in the El condition, who did not un­
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dergo self-dissatisfaction, may have been in agreement 
with the persuasive message, but this apparently did 
not have the long-term impact necessary to affect value 
change.
finally, an attempt was made to assess the impact 
of value change on subsequent behavioral change. It 
was hypothesized that those conditions in which value 
change was evident would show a significantly greater 
number of subjects willing to act on their egalitarian 
values. That is, subjects in these conditions would be 
more willing to sign a letter endorsing ERA. Since 
this measure only involved intent and not public be­
havior, an attempt was made to determine if intent to 
sign would result in the actual signing and returning 
of the letter. Thus, it was hypothesized that these 
conditions would have a significantly greater number 
of signed, returned letters than conditions not showing 
value change.
Although the II condition, the only one to have dem­
onstrated significant value change, had the greatest 
proportion of stated intentions as well as actual let­
ters returned, there were no significant differences 
among the conditions. Apparently, the value change 
manipulation was either too weak to have a meaningful 
impact on behavior, or else it was not durable enough
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to maintain itself during the extended pre-measure per­
iod. It is also possible that the letter-signing 
task was not representative of behaviors dictated by 
an egalitarian self-concept. At any rate, it may be 
concluded here that there is little apparent behavior 
change effected by the modification of subjects' values 
by self-confrontation procedures.
It is unclear as to why the value change effect 
that was found did not extend to the behavioral measures.
It was originally believed that despite traditionally 
low return rates of mailed survey material, subjects 
ranking Equality high relative to controls would be more 
likely to both express a willingness to sign pro-ERA 
material and to act upon that commitment. Perhaps, 
subjects do not extend their concept of equality to 
the Equal Rights Amendment. In any case, if it is as­
sumed that value change has indeed taken place here, 
then it must be considered that behaviors may be in­
consistent with values, much as rhey are often incon­
sistent with attitudes. Theoretically, some sort of 
"balance" concept might apply which could explain such 
"value-discrepant" behavior.
The present study has attempted to either extend or 
modify Rokeach's self-confrontation theory of value 
change. The data suggest that while there seems to be
little evidence for a reference group influence expla­
nation of Rokeach-type effects, there does seem to he 
some evidence for the self-dissatisfaction construct 
which Rokeach employs to explain his theory. However, 
the outcomes of such value change attempts seem to hinge 
on the type of message employed. Intrinsic inconsisten­
cies, which are those derived solely from the subject’s 
own value system and self-concept, seem to have greater 
impact on value change than do extrinsic inconsistencies, 
which take into account information based on an external 
source in its inconsistency. V/hile it has been sugges­
ted that intrinsic inconsistencies result in greater self 
dissatisfaction than do extrinsic inconsistencies, the 
reasons for this and the variables affecting each type 
of.' inconsistency may generate future research.
In addition, value change that does take place seems 
to have little impact on behavior change. It is possible 
that such behavior changes based on alterations of value 
systems may be largely dependent on such variables as 
the subject’s perceived relevance of the issue to the 
value, and the extent to which subjects are themselves 
ego-involved, with the issue. future research might 
examine this paradigm by manipulating different issues 
and subjects’ potential involvement with them.
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Appendix A
Instructions for Intrinsic Inconsistency Condition
This is a scientific study of value systems. There 
are no right or wrong answers in this study. The best 
answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we 
have already found out about the value systems of LSU 
students. I am sure that many of you would like to 
know what they are. Below is a list of 18 values in 
alphabetical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative im­
portance of these values to the LSU student population. 
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students 
here recently. These students were asked to place a 
one next to the value which they thought most important 
Jtlierri, a two next to the value which they thought 
second most important, etc. The value which they thought 
least important was ranked 18th.
The numbers you see next to the values are the av­
erage ranking received by each value from all the stu­
dents. Please examine the list carefully.
(Value list with ranks)
One of the most interesting findings here is that 
the students, on the average, felt that Freedom was very 
important— they ranked it one; but they felt that Equal­
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ity was considerably less .important— they ranked it 11. 
Apparently, LSU students value freedom far more highly 
than they value equality. This suggests that LSU stu­
dents in general are much more interested in their own 
freedom than they are in freedom for other people.
Think about this for a few moments. How strongly 
do you agree with this interpretation?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
(check one)
Strongly agree strongly disagree
Would you please answer honestly the following 
question in a related area:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters 
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
  Yes, and I have personally worked for the Amendment.
  Yes, but I have not personally worked for the
Amendment.
 No .
This is the end of this phase of our experiment. We 
remind you that in order for your participation to be 
valid in this study, you must be here for the second 
phase which will be in two weeks. We thank you and 
nope this has been an interesting and instructive ex­
perience for you.
Appendix B
Instructions for Reference Group only Condition 
This is a scientific study of value systems.
There are no right or wrong answers in this study.
The best answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we 
have already found out about the value systems of LSU 
students. I am sure that many of you would like to know 
what they are. Below is a list of 18 values in alpha­
betical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative im- 
porxance of these values to the LSU student population. 
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students 
here recently. These students were asked to place a one 
next to the value which they thought most important to 
them, a two next to the value which they thought second 
most important, etc. The value which they thought least 
important was ranked 18th. Please examine the list 
carefully.
(Value list without ranks)
Now, would you please answer honestly the following 
question in a related area;
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters 
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
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  Yes, and I have personally worked for the Amendment.
  Yes, hut I have not personally worked .for the
Amendment.
  Wo.
The 298 students in the study described above were 
asked this same question. The students1 results were 
divided into 3 groups, according to how they responded.
The table below shows the average ranking of the values 
Freedom and Equality for each of these three groups: 
AVERAGE RANKINGS OE FREEDOM & EQUALITY
_____________BY LSU STUDENTS______________
Yes, & have worked Yes, but have not worked No
for the Amendment________for the Amendment_______________
Freedom 6 1 2
Equality 5 11 17
Notice in the table that:
1) Pro- and anti- ERA students all value 
freedom relatively highly. Of 18 values 
all groups rank Freedom among the top six.
2} Students who are strongly for FRA value 
Equality rather highly— they ranked it five. 
But those against ERA place a much lower 
value on Equality--they ranked it 17- Those 
who are non-participants but sympathetic 
ranked Equality 11.
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Think about these results for a few moments.
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to 
be valid in this study, you must be here for the second 
phase which will be in two v/eeks. We thank you and hope 
this has been an interesting and instructive experience 
for you.
Appendix G
Instructions for Extrinsic Inconsistency Condition
This is a scientific study of value systems. There 
are no right or wrong answers in this study. The best 
answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we 
have already found out about the value systerns of LSU 
students. I am sure that many of you would like to know 
what they are. Below is a list of 18 values in alpha­
betical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative 
importance of these values to the LSU student population. 
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students 
here recently. These students were asked to place a 
one next to the value which they thought most imjjo-r- 
tant to them, a two next to the value which they thought 
second most important, etc. The value which they thought 
least important was ranked 18th. Please examine the 
list carefully.
(Value list without ranks)
Now, would you please answer honestly the following 
question in a related area:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters 
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
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  Yes, and. I have personally worked for the Amendment.
  Yes, but I have not personally worked for the
Amendment.
 __ N o .
The 298 students in the study described above 
were asked this same question. The students' results 
were divided into three groups, according to how they 
responded. The table below shows the average ranking of 
the values Freedom and Equality for each of these three 
groups:
AVERAGE RANKINGS OF FREEDOM & EQUALITY
______________ BY LSU_STUDENTS_________________
Yes, & have worked for Yes, but have not No
the Amendment_________________ worked for the Amendment______
Freedom 6 1 2
Equality 5 11 17
Notice in the table that:
1) Pro- and anti-ERA students all value freedom 
relatively highly. Of 18 values, all groups 
rank Freedom among the top six.
2) Students who are strongly for ERA value 
Equality rather highly— they ranked it five. 
But those against FRA place a much lower value 
on Equality— they ranked it 17. Those who
85
are non-participants but are sympathetic ranked
Equality 11.
Apparently, both freedom and equality are important 
to some people, while to others freedom is very important 
but equality is not. This raises the question whether 
those who are against ERA are really saying that they 
care a great deal about their own freedom but are in­
different to other people's freedom. Those who are for 
ERA are perhaps really saying they not only want freedom 
for themselves but for other people too. What do you 
think?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
I strongly agree I strongly disagree
with this interpretation. with this interpret­
ation .
(Please check one)
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to 
be valid in this study, you must be here for the second 
phase which will be in two weeks. We thank you and hope 
this has been an interesting and instructive experience 
for you.
Appendix D 
Posttest Instructions-All Groups 
Today we would like to find out about your values. 
Your task is to arrange the values below in order of their 
importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life.
Put a one next to the most important value, a two next 
to the second most important value, etc., down to the 
18th and least important value. Please don't hesitate 
to erase or to change answers in any way. The end re­
sult should show how you truly feel (if you have already 
completed this survey, please complete it again. It 
is very important.).
(Value Survey)
This is the end of our study. The purpose and 
results of the study will be explained to you in class, 
after all the results have been analyzed, probably in 
a few weeks. Thank you for your participation.
86
Appendix E 
Control G-roup Instructions 
Phase I
This is a scientific study of value systems. There 
are no right or wrong answers in this study. The best 
answer is j'our own personal opinion.
Below is a list of 18 values in alphabetical order. 
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students 
here recently. These students were asked to place a 
one next to the value which they thought most important 
"k° a riex't “t0 ^he value they thought second
most important, etc. The value which they thought least 
important was ranked 18th. Please examine the list 
carefully.
(Value list without ranks)
Now, wrou!d you please answer honest3_y the following 
question in a related area:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters of 
the Equal Rights Amendment?
  Yes, and I have worked for the Amendment.
  Yes, but I have not worked for the Amendment.
  N o.
Now we would 1ike to find out about your values.
Your task is to arrange the values below in order of 
their importance to YOur, as guiding principles in YOUR
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life. Put a one next to the most important value, a 
two next to the second most important value, etc., 
down to the 18th and least important value. Please 
don’t hesitate to erase or to change answers in any way. 
The end i^esult should show how you truly feel.
(Value Survey)
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to 
he valid in this study, you must be here for the second 
phase which will be in two weeks. We thank you 
and hope this has been an interesting and instructive 
experience for you.
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